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ABSTRACT
This study develops theory and uses a door-to-door fundraising field experiment to explore the
economics  of  charity.  We  approached  nearly  5000  households,  randomly  divided  into  four
experimental treatments, to shed light on key issues on the demand side of charitable fundraising.
Empirical  results  are  in  line  with  our  theory:  in  gross  terms,  our  lottery  treatments  raised
considerably more money than our voluntary contributions treatments. Interestingly, we find that a
one standard deviation increase in female solicitor physical attractiveness is similar to that of the
lottery incentive¡ªthe magnitude of the estimated difference in gifts is roughly equivalent to the
treatment effect of moving from our theoretically most attractive approach (lotteries) to our least








I.  Introduction 
In 2003, more than $240 billion—exceeding 2 percent of U.S. GDP—was 
contributed to American philanthropic organizations.  Even though charitable giving 
continues to grow at rapid rates, relatively little is known about the economics of charity.  
Early fundraising efforts typically relied on voluntary contributions mechanisms (VCM), 
but recently other methods have surfaced.  For example, lotteries have helped to fund 
everything from the universities of Harvard, Princeton, and Yale to local public goods 
such as bridges and municipal buildings.  Frank Fahrenkopf Jr., the gaming industry's 
chief lobbyist, notes that “We probably wouldn't have been a nation (without) the 
lotteries.”
1  While lotteries grow increasingly popular, their relative efficacy remains 
under-researched.  Indeed, even the most primitive empirical facts concerning alternative 
fundraising mechanisms are largely unknown.   
Our study focuses on several key issues in the economics and practice of 
charitable fundraising by providing a theoretical model as well as a door-to-door field 
experiment to test the theory.
2  Our theory models individual contribution decisions under 
the VCM, the VCM with an initial seed money donation, and both the single- and 
multiple-prize variants of a charitable lottery.  The underlying framework includes an 
extension of Andreoni’s (1989; 1990) impure altruism model, thereby allowing 
solicitor/solicitee interaction to influence contribution levels.  Our theory predicts that the 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, President Washington purchased the first ticket for a federal lottery—sponsored to finance 
improvements in Washington, D.C.—in 1793.  By the 1830s, more than 420 lotteries nationwide offered 
prizes.  While a subsequent backlash ignited anti-gambling crusades, since the mid-1960s lotteries and 
other forms of legalized gambling have spread to every state but Utah and Hawaii.  The above Fahrenkopf 
quotation is taken from the Cincinnati Post article of Barry M. Horstman (September 13, 1997). 
2 We would have preferred to test our theory using a much less labor intensive fundraising method—such 
as a phone or mail solicitation—but regulatory guidelines concerning lotteries prohibit the use of these 
types of solicitations for such a gambling exercise.   
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total provision of the public good in the VCM treatment where seed money is provided 
exceeds that elicited from a VCM without seed money.  Furthermore, every lottery we 
consider dominates the VCM both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors 
attracted.  The intuition behind this result is that competition for a private lottery prize 
introduces a compensating externality that attenuates the free-rider problem (Morgan, 
2000).  This negative externality reduces the difference between private and social 
benefits from contributing to the public good and thereby increases total contributions to 
the public good relative to a situation where no lottery prize is provided.   
We investigate the effects of using lotteries and seed money in an actual 
charitable giving campaign by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to organize a 
capital campaign at East Carolina University (ECU).  We designed the campaign closely 
following fundraiser guidance and our theoretical model by randomly dividing solicitors 
into four treatments, two that made use of the VCM and two that used lotteries. 
Several interesting insights emerge.  For example, the lottery treatments raised 
roughly 50 percent more in gross proceeds than our VCM treatments.  This result is 
largely driven by greater participation rates in the lotteries:  lotteries increase 
participation rates by roughly 100 percent.  This finding highlights an attractive feature of 
lotteries:  they provide fundraisers with a tool to generate “warm lists,” or a larger pool of 
active donors to draw from in future fundraising drives.  This result is important in light 
of the fact that fundraising strategists typically rank building a “donor development 
pyramid” as the most important aspect of a successful long-term fundraising effort.
3  In 
                                                 
3 This long-term aspect of building a donor base is invaluable because start-up fundraisers typically lose 
money in their first few attempts (see, e.g., Sargeant et al., 2005).     3
this spirit, use of lotteries provides the fundraiser with a “double dividend,” earning more 
funds immediately as well as securing a larger warm list than VCMs garner.   
Our experimental design also permits an exploration of whether, and to what 
extent, individual solicitor characteristics influence fundraising success.  We find that a 
one-standard deviation increase in physical attractiveness among women solicitors 
increases the average gift by 50%-135%.  This result is largely driven by increased 
participation rates among households where a male answered the door.  While this 
finding might not be surprising to marketers, such an “apples-to-apples” comparison 
between “mechanism” and “non-mechanism” treatment effects is rare in the literature.  In 
this sense, our finding that the “physically attractive” treatment effect is in the 
neighborhood of the difference in fundraising success between our theoretically most 
attractive approach (lotteries) and our least attractive approach (voluntary contributions) 
is of significant note.  There is also some limited evidence that other solicitor 
characteristics, such as obesity and self-confidence, influence fundraising success, and 
that social connectivity between the solicitor and household matters.   
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows.  The next section provides our 
theoretical framework on which we base our field experiment.  Section III describes our 
field experimental design.  Section IV summarizes our findings.  Section V concludes.   
II. Theoretical Model 
 
  We develop a simple model of the voluntary provision of public goods to provide 
direction to our field experimental design and to highlight clearly the factors determining 
giving in a door-to-door fundraising campaign.  Besides risk aversion and heterogeneous 
marginal valuations for the public good, the actual interaction between solicitors and   4
solicitees might play an important role in the context of fundraising.
4  For example, 
potential contributors might feel more inclined to give to a solicitor who has certain 
personal attributes or one with whom he shares certain qualities.  This could come in 
many forms, such as a “warm-glow” from giving.  We therefore apply a variant of 
Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) impure altruism model.  
We begin by modeling n symmetric agents,  1,..., in = , who derive utility from 
consuming a numeraire good,  i y , a public good at level G , and (possibly) from their 
own contribution  i b  to the public good.  Agents face a budget constraint  ii ybw +≤ and 
ex-post utility is additively separable in the following way: 
() () () ii i Uu y h G f b θ γ =+ + ,     (1) 
where ( ) u   , ( ) h   , and  ( ) f    are (strictly) increasing and concave, and  {0,1} θ ∈ .  We 
allow for risk-aversion with respect to the numeraire consumption good ( ''( ) 0 u ≤   ).
5  
The term  ( ) f γ    depicts the warm-glow effect from giving, which depends on the 
solicitor and solicitee characteristics, as described by the parameter γ .  The value of the 
public good is given by  ( ) hG θ  and is assumed to satisfy the Samuelson condition 
'(0) '( ) nh u w > .  As such, the provision of the public good is socially desirable whenever 
                                                 
4 There is some evidence from laboratory experiments that such relational matters are important.  For 
example, Andreoni and Petrie (2004a, 2004b) find experimental evidence that identifying participants in a 
public goods experiment by showing their pictures has a substantial influence on giving behavior.   
Evidence on the importance of social interaction on trust and cooperative behavior can also be found in 
Glaeser et al. (2000) and Dufwenberg and Muren (2002).   
5 The additive separability allows us to concentrate on the impact of increased risk-aversion with respect to 
the numeraire as measured by  ''( )/ '( ) uu −    .  We do not make any specific assumption on the functional 
form of  () u   ; thus, properties such as constant/increasing/decreasing absolute or relative risk-aversion are 
special cases of our analysis.  As our gamble sizes do not differ substantially (chance to win $250 in one 
treatment and $1000 in the other treatment), we suppress discussion of differing local or global risk 
attitudes (see, e.g., Chetty 2003, Rabin 2000).  The interested reader should see Chetty and Szeidl (2004) 
for a discussion of preferences that might be locally CRRA.  
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1 θ = .  Further, we assume that agents have incomplete information regarding the value 
of the public good (or the credibility of the charity), and attach a probability 0 1
nS µ <≤  
that the value is  ( ) hG ( 1 θ = ) and probability 1
nS µ −  that the value is zero ( 0 θ = ). 
As discussed in Vesterlund (2003), a charity can possibly gain credibility and/or 
reveal the type and value of the public good by announcing “seed money” contributions 
that it has already received prior to eliciting contributions from the public at large.
6  To 
reflect the informational value of announcing contributions, we assume that an agent’s 
beliefs regarding the value of the public good change to 
Sn S µ µ >  whenever the 
fundraiser announces seed money in a VCM.  Further, we assume that beliefs change to 
L µ  when running a lottery whose prizes have been provided by an external donor.  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism 
Under the VCM, individuals give according to the first-order condition (for an 
interior solution): 
'( ) '( ) '( )
nS nS nS nS uwb hn b fb µγ −= + ,     (2) 
without seed money, and according to  
0 '( ) '( ) '( )
SS S S uwb hP n b fb µγ −= + + ,    (3) 
if a seed money contribution  0 0 P >  is announced.  In this case, 
nS b  and 
S b  denote the 
respective individual contribution levels.  
                                                 
6  Andreoni (1998) discusses a different effect of seed money:  his model of charitable giving for a 
threshold public good has multiple equilibria, and in the absence of seed money there exists a Nash 
equilibrium with zero charitable giving.  The zero-contribution equilibrium can be eliminated, however, by 
initial commitments of seed money, which lower the remaining amount needed to be raised in the public 
fundraising campaign.  Thus, in his model seed money is used as an elimination device rather than as a 
credibility device.  List and Lucking-Reiley (2001) provide a test of this effect of seed money and find 
evidence in favor of seed money acting as a credibility device, consonant with our theoretical model.   
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Seed money contributions, therefore, have two partially offsetting effects on 
individual contribution levels.  First, seed money reduces uncertainty about the credibility 
and value of a charitable organization, which generates an increase in equilibrium 
contributions.  Second, seed money increases the provision level of the public good.  This 
reduces marginal utility, which may lead to a reduction in individual contributions.   
Despite these offsetting effects, the total provision of the public good in the case of a 
VCM with seed money ( 0
S nb P + ) exceeds that elicited from a VCM without seed 
money, 
nS nb .
7  Further, concavity of the utility functions immediately implies that 
contributions under both VCMs increase in the weight on warm-glow, γ .  
Charitable Lotteries 
We examine a charitable fundraiser who chooses to use a lottery in order to 
alleviate the strong free-riding incentives in the VCM.
8  For simplicity, we assume that 
the fundraiser has to decide between a single prize lottery (SPL), which pays one prize 
(
SPL PP = ), and a multi-prize lottery (MPL), which splits the prize money into two 
identically valued prizes ( 12
MPL PPP P == = ) and each agent can win only one prize (all 
arguments extend to the more general k-prize lottery).  The probability 
L
i π  of agent i 
winning a prize in lottery  { } , LS P L M P L ∈  depends on all agents’ contributions  j b  
( 1,..., jn = ).
9 
                                                 
7 This follows immediately from the first-order condition (3) as  () u   ,  () h   , and  () f    are concave, and 
Sn S µ µ > .  
8 In this sense, our theoretical model contributes to the literature by studying the incentives to contribute 
under risk-aversion in an impure altruism model.  Further, we concentrate on risk-aversion regarding the 
numeraire consumption.   
9 If the agent purchases  i b  tickets and each opponent contributes  i b− , her probability of winning the prize 
in lottery SPL is given by: /
SPL
ii bB π=  where  (1 ) ii B bnb − = +− , while in lottery MPL the probability   7
The expected utility of an agent i for lotteries  { , } LS P L M P L ∈  is given by  
() ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
LL L L L
ii i i i i EU u w b P u w b h B f b ππ µ γ =− + + − − + +,   (4) 
where B represents aggregate contributions to the public good.  Maximizing (4) with 
respect to bi leads to the following first-order condition for the optimal contribution level 
of agent i: 
0 [ () ( ) ] ' ()














=− + − − − − +
∂
−− − + +
.   (5) 
This optimality condition directly implies that individual (and therefore aggregate) 
contributions to the public good are increasing in γ , i.e. in the weight on the warm-glow 
effect.  Based on first order condition (5), we can compare the equilibrium contributions 
with those under the VCM: 
Proposition 1. With symmetric agents, under any lottery and any finite level of risk-
aversion, average individual contribution levels to the public good exceed those under 
the VCM with and without seed money if the credibility of the charity satisfies 
LS µ µ ≥  
and 
Ln S µ µ ≥ , respectively.  If running the lottery makes the charity less credible than 
the VCM, the rank ordering of the mechanisms is ambiguous. 
Proof: see Appendix A 
This result highlights that the lottery provides additional incentives to contribute 
to the public good beyond the incentives inherent in the VCM.  If announcing donations 
                                                                                                                                                 
of winning either the first or the second (equally valued) prize is given by 
(1 )
(1 ) ( 1 )
MPL ii i i i
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symmetric equilibria.  For those, the probabilities are given by  1/
SPL n i π =  and  2/
MPL n i π = , and for the 
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of prizes provides the charity with no less credibility than announcing a seed gift, the 
contribution levels in a charitable lottery exceed those under the VCM.  If this 
assumption does not hold, then we cannot compare the rank ordering of contributions 
across these two mechanisms.  Since we cannot ensure that this assumption holds in our 
field experiment, our results provide a conservative test on the dominance of the lottery 
as a fundraising mechanism.  This is indicative of field experiments of this type, which 
are not as “clean” as well-designed laboratory experiments—where researchers have 
more control by inducing preferences to accord with theoretical assumptions and by 
excluding other complicating factors.   
Single- Versus Multiple-Prize Lottery  
We now turn to the issue of comparing contribution levels across the single- and 
multiple-prize variants of the charitable lottery.  Comparing contribution levels for the 
two lotteries, we obtain the following result: 
Proposition 2. With symmetric agents and for low levels of individual risk aversion, 
equilibrium average contribution levels are higher if only one prize is provided, whereas 
for highly risk averse agents, average contributions are larger when the prize is split into 
two identical prizes.   
Proof:  see Appendix A 
We can therefore increase contributions by splitting the prize and providing more than 
one prize if the level of risk aversion exceeds a certain threshold, i.e.  () u    is sufficiently 
concave.  The same reasoning holds for the introduction of up to  1 n−  prizes.  In addition 
to risk-aversion, the level of heterogeneity in individual valuations of the public good will 
also influence the ranking of the two lotteries.  This result is shown in Appendix A.
10 
                                                 
10 Of course, we cannot control for risk-aversion and valuation of agents in our field experiment which 
makes it impossible to provide an unambiguous hypothesis on the ranking of single- vs. multi-prize 
lotteries.   
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Effects on the Extensive Margin 
Thus far our comparisons have concentrated on symmetric agents and symmetric 
equilibrium, leading to mechanism gains arising on the intensive margin, i.e. participation 
rates are identical, but average contributions increase.  This changes if we allow agents to 
have heterogeneous marginal valuations for the public good.  Assuming that agents’ 
marginal valuation of the public good allows a ranking  '( ) '( ) ij hG hG ≥  for all ij <  and 
all provision levels G , it is found that only agents with the highest marginal valuation 
contribute under the VCM and VCM with seed money treatments: 
,V C M max '( ) 1
Sn S
ii hG µ = .  Charitable lotteries, however, may induce participation by 
agents with lower marginal valuations.  This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.  With risk-neutral agents whose marginal valuation can be ranked 
independently of the provision level of the public good and for lotteries providing 
identical credibility to the charity as seed money (
SL µ µ = ), lotteries yield higher or 
identical participation rates and higher average contribution levels than a VCM.   
Proof:  see Appendix A 
  This result highlights a potential “double-dividend” of using lotteries:  not only 
are aggregate contributions enhanced, but the prize structure can induce greater 
participation rates.  Fundraising strategists around the globe understand the importance of 
building a “donor development pyramid,” which includes as its base first-time donors.  
The base is commonly understood to be the most difficult, yet most important, 
component in building a successful long-term fundraising effort. 
Individual Characteristics 
In our experimental setting of door-to-door fundraising, the face-to-face 
interaction of solicitors and solicitees permits a potentially rich exploration of social 
interaction effects.  Our theoretical model captures this interaction via the parameterγ .    10
There are several underlying mechanisms that might be at work in our environment.  For 
example, evidence from the psychology, marketing, and economics literatures suggest 
that not only the personal characteristics of the solicitor matter, but also the social 
distance between solicitor and solicitee (see Bertrand et al., 2005, for a review and novel 
field experiment that “prices” psychology).   
In this spirit, there is a growing empirical literature that examines the effects of 
individual personal attractiveness on labor market outcomes (see, e.g., Hamermesh and 
Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Mobius and Rosenblatt, 2004).  These 
studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the physical attractiveness of a 
worker and labor market outcomes.  In addition, economists have recently begun to 
provide theoretical models relating individual self-confidence (or related personality 
constructs) and market outcomes, conjecturing that there is a positive link (see, e.g., 
Bearden et al, 2001; Benabou and Tirole, 2002).   
Concerning social distance, Andreoni and Petrie (2004b, pg. 6) note that “working 
with familiar others can reduce transactions costs, as familiarity can enhance trust.”  If a 
similar phenomenon occurs in our field environment – i.e., potential donors trust (or 
prefer) solicitors of like social groupings – then one might expect to see differential rates 
of giving between solicitors and donors of similar race and/or gender.  In our field 
experiment we carefully measure each of these factors, allowing us to determine their 
importance and control for their influences when exploring tests of our theory.   
III. Experimental Design 
  Following our theory, we designed a door-to-door fundraising solicitation to 
allow a clean comparison between four different treatments – a VCM with and without   11
seed money, a fixed-prize lottery with only a single cash prize, and a fixed-prize lottery 
with multiple cash prizes.  Door-to-door fundraising is widely used by a diverse range of 
organizations.  While there is a large literature on the benefits of inter-personal, door-to-
door solicitations as opposed to less personal solicitation methods (see, e.g., Fraser et al. 
1988), to our knowledge these comparisons consider only VCMs.
11   
Part I:  The Experimental Treatments 
  In each treatment, households in predetermined neighborhood blocks in Pitt 
County, North Carolina, were approached by a paid solicitor and asked if they would like 
to make a contribution to support the Center for Natural Hazards Mitigation Research at 
East Carolina University.
12  Households that answered the door were provided an 
informational brochure about the Hazards Center and read a fixed script that outlined the 
reason for the solicitors’ visit.  The script included a brief introduction which informed 
the resident of who the solicitors were, the purpose of their visit, a two-sentence summary 
of the non-profit organization, and the details of the charitable raffle (when applicable).  
A copy of the script for the single-prize lottery is provided in Appendix B. 
  Across all treatments, potential donors were informed that proceeds raised in the 
campaign would be used to fund the Hazards Center.  In the VCM with seed money 
treatment, potential donors were also informed that the Hazards Center had already 
received a commitment of $1000 from an anonymous donor.  In the single-prize lottery 
                                                 
11 Recently, the economics literature has witnessed a nice surge of natural field experiments (see Harrison 
and List, 2004, for field experimental terminology) exploring charitable fundraising using mail and phone 
solicitations (see, e.g., Frey and Meier, 2004; Falk, 2004; Croson and Shang, 2005; Eckel and Grossman, 
2005). 
12 The Natural Hazard Mitigation Research Center was authorized to begin operations in the fall of 2004 by 
the North Carolina state government.  The Hazard Center was founded in response to the widespread 
devastation in Eastern North Carolina caused by hurricanes Dennis and Floyd, and designed to provide 
support and coordination for research on natural hazard risks.  For more information on the Hazard 
Mitigation Research Center see www.artsci.ecu.edu/cas/auxiliary/hazardcenter/home.htm.     12
treatment, households were informed that each dollar contributed to the Hazards Center 
would provide them with one ticket for a raffle where the winner would receive a $1000 
pre-paid credit card.  In the multiple-prize lottery treatment, households were informed 
that each dollar contributed would provide one chance in a raffle that would award four 
$250 pre-paid credit cards as prizes.  Households were informed that they were eligible to 
win only one of the four pre-paid credit cards.  Agents in the lottery treatments were 
informed that their chances of winning the raffle would be based upon their ticket 
purchases relative to the number of tickets purchased by other households in Pitt County.   
  At this point, it is important to consider that we attempted to make the field 
experiment correspond closely to naturally occurring door-to-door fundraising drives.   
Thus, when crafting our script, we closely followed generally accepted guidelines in such 
matters as the provision of information and other theoretically important factors.  Such an 
approach is different from laboratory experiments, wherein the scholar attempts to create 
a sterile environment that necessitates careful control of individual preferences, others’ 
preferences, group size, and the like.   
  Table 1 summarizes our experimental design.  The experimental treatments were 
conducted on four different weekends between October 2nd and November 13th, 2004.  
Our design resulted in a sample of 4833 households approached – 1186 in the VCM, 
1282 in the VCM with seed money, 963 in the single-prize lottery, and 1402 in the 
multiple-prize lottery.  Of the households approached, a total of 1755 answered the door 
and spoke to a solicitor, and 522 made a contribution to the Hazards Center.   
Part 2: Recruiting and Training the Solicitors   13
  As Table 1 reveals, we employed forty-four solicitors – seven in the VCM 
treatment, twelve in the VCM with seed money treatment, ten in the single-prize lottery 
treatment, and fifteen in the multiple-prize lottery treatment.  All solicitors participated 
during a single weekend and elicited contributions within a single treatment.  Solicitors 
were not aware of the alternate treatments and while running the experiment we took 
great care to ensure that solicitors in different experimental treatments were isolated from 
one another to prevent cross-contamination and information exchange across treatments.  
Each solicitor’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) consideration of an 
invitation to work as a paid volunteer for the research center, (2) an in-person interview, 
(3) a training session, and (4) participation as a solicitor in the door-to-door campaign. 
  Undergraduate solicitors were recruited from the student body at ECU via flyers 
posted around campus, announcements on a university electronic bulletin board, 
advertisements in the local campus newspaper, and direct appeal to students during 
undergraduate economics courses.  All potential solicitors were told that they would be 
paid $10 per hour during training and employment.  Interested solicitors were instructed 
to contact the Economics Department to schedule an interview.   
  Initial fifteen-minute interviews were conducted in private offices of the 
Economics Department faculty.  Upon arrival to the interview, students completed an 
application form and a short survey questionnaire.  In addition to questions about 
undergraduate major, GPA, and previous work experience, the job application included 
questions about height and weight which were used to construct an indicator of body 
mass index (BMI).  The survey questionnaire (see Appendix C) was composed of 20 
categorical-response questions – scaled from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree –   14
providing information about five potentially important personality traits of the 
applicant.
13  Questions were designed to elicit measures of assertiveness, sociability, self-
efficacy, performance motivation, and self-confidence.  The survey contained two 
questions each from both a positive and a negative frame for the five traits.  Following 
the literature, we scaled responses from -5 to -1 (negative frame) and 1 to 5 (positive 
frame); thus, individual measures for the personality traits lie within the set {-8, 8}. 
All applicants delivered completed forms to the interviewer prior to the in-person 
interview.  Before the interview began, the interviewer explained the purpose of the non-
profit research center and the nature of the solicitation work that was to be performed.  
The interview process consisted of a brief review of the applicants’ work experience, 
followed by questions relating to his or her communication skills, confidence in soliciting 
donations for a non-profit organization, ability to handle rejection in this context, and 
motivation for being in college.  We video-recorded all in-person interviews, which 
lasted approximately 10 minutes.  Upon concluding the interview, every applicant was 
offered employment as a solicitor.   
Once hired, all solicitors attended a one-hour training session.  Solicitors were 
randomly assigned to an experimental treatment and training session.  Each training 
session was conducted by the same researcher and covered a single treatment.
14  The 
training sessions provided the solicitor with background/historical information of the 
Hazards Center and reviewed the organization’s mission statement and purpose.   
                                                 
13 In constructing the personality survey, we followed the International Personality Item Pool (see 
www.ipip.org). 
14 For each round of the experiment, we ran separate training sessions for each treatment, scheduled every 
75 minutes throughout the Friday morning before the solicitors canvassed the neighborhoods.  The training 
sessions were typically held a few days after the initial interview process.   
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Solicitors were provided a copy of the informational brochure and the press release 
announcing the formation of the Hazards Center.  Once solicitors were familiarized with 
the Hazards Center, the trainer reviewed the data collection procedures.  Solicitors were 
provided with a copy of the data record sheet which included columns to record the race, 
gender, and approximate age of potential donors, along with their contribution level.  The 
trainer stressed the importance of recording contribution (and non-contribution) data 
immediately upon conclusion of each household visit.  
Next, the trainer reviewed the solicitation script with the solicitors and, in the 
lottery treatments, explained the lottery rules/procedures.  At the conclusion of the 
training session, the solicitors practiced their script in front of the trainer and the other 
solicitors.  When necessary, the trainer provided immediate feedback to the solicitor on 
ways in which the pitch could be improved.  Next, the solicitors had two further 
opportunities to practice their script by knocking on two different office doors and 
soliciting contributions in the Economics Department.  Personnel in the Economics 
Department evaluated the “sales pitch,” which was used to provide feedback to the 
solicitor on his or her performance. 
Part 3: Further Solicitor Information:  Personal Attractiveness Rankings 
  In the final step, we gathered one last piece of information.  In the spirit of the 
procedures of Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), we derived measures of physical 
attractiveness for each solicitor.  Digital photos of each solicitor were taken during the 
initial interview to prepare an identification badge.  Photographs were then randomly 
allocated into files that contained the pictures of three other solicitors.  The files were 
printed in color and independently evaluated by 152 different observers.  The   16
independent observers were undergraduate students from one of two large introductory-
level economics courses at the University of Maryland–College Park.
15  
  Each observer evaluated twelve different photographs and was asked to place 
each photograph on a scale of (1) homely, extremely unattractive, to (10) model beautiful 
or handsome.  This resulted in a total sample of 1824 personal attractiveness rankings.  
Each rater’s scores were normalized to yield a standardized scale across different raters.  
Normalized ratings 
N








= , where  ij a is the personal 
attractiveness ranking of evaluator j for solicitor i,  j a is the mean personal attractiveness 
ranking across all solicitors for evaluator j, and  j σ is the standard deviation in personal 
attractiveness rankings for evaluator j.  The normalization procedure results in personal 
attractiveness rankings that are distributed standard normal.  To generate our final 
personal attractiveness measure, the standardized ratings 
N
ij a  for each solicitor i were 
averaged over the evaluators j. 
Before proceeding to the results discussion, we should highlight a few important 
design issues.  First, as previously noted, in carrying out our door-to-door campaign, we 
wished to solicit donors in a way that matched, as closely as possible, the current state of 
the art in fundraising.  We therefore used the local newspaper to advertise the fundraising 
campaign to notify the public that the Hazards Center was a legitimate entity and that 
ECU representatives might be visiting their households in the near future.  Second, 
                                                 
15 As noted in Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), the notion that physical attractiveness can systematically 
affect economic outcomes critically depends on the assumption that there are common standards of beauty 
in any population.  Such common standards have been demonstrated in studies by Zebrowitz et al. (1993), 
Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), and Mobius and Rosenblatt (2004).  We therefore are comfortable in using 
University of Maryland students to evaluate ECU students’ physical attractiveness.   17
solicitors were provided an attractive polo shirt on which the name of the non-profit 
organization was professionally embroidered and were instructed to wear khaki pants (or 
shorts) during their door-to-door solicitations in order to provide a formal, standardized 
appearance.  Third, each solicitor wore an identification badge that included his or her 
picture, name, and city solicitation permit number.  Fourth, solicitors distributed an 
information brochure after introducing themselves to potential donors.  Fifth, we 
randomly allocated solicitors across neighborhoods and treatment type, and solicitors 
remained in the same treatment throughout the weekend.   
Finally, to summarize, we have gathered a rich set of solicitor and household 
control variables.  Not only do we have measures of several potentially relevant solicitor 
attributes (age, race, gender, work experience, beauty, BMI, and personality scores), we 
also have gathered data on the households that our solicitors approached.  After the 
interaction with the household, each solicitor filled out forms that included the estimated 
age, gender, and race of the potential contributor.   
IV. Experimental Results 
  Our first set of hypotheses compares the VCMs with the lotteries.  Table 2 
presents summary statistics, which includes information on the success of the various 
treatments, as well as solicitor and household characteristics.  Table 2 indicates, for 
example, that our solicitors approached 1186 households in the VCM treatment, and had 
a chance to speak to 446 of these households, of which 113 chose to contribute to the 
Hazards Center.     18
In total, we raised $452, $526, $688, and $752 in the four treatments.
16  
Consistent with our theory, the lottery treatments raised considerably more money than 
the VCM treatments.  Our theory predicts that this increase might occur on both the 
intensive and extensive margins:  first, the percentage of households contributing in the 
lotteries exceeds the percentage of households contributing in the VCM treatments.   
Second, the average contribution in the lottery treatments dominates the average 
contribution in the VCM treatments.  We consider these two possibilities in turn.  
As summarized in Table 2, in the VCM treatment, 25.3% of the households (113 
out of 446) made a contribution to the Hazards Center.  In the seed money treatment, this 
proportion was only 14.8% (67 out of 453).  For the single- (multiple-) prize lotteries the 
respective proportions of contributing households were 45.5% (165 out of 363) and 
35.9% (177 out of 493).  In constructing a statistical test for these data, it is important to 
realize that these proportions are independent across the four treatments, but dependent 
within treatment—i.e., any given solicitor approaches a number of households.  We 
therefore use a conservative test at the solicitor level by calculating the individual 
solicitor average success rate, and then rank solicitors via these averages.   
Figure 1 summarizes success rates by plotting the percentages of households that 
contributed at the solicitor level—i.e., each observation is a solicitor average.  One clear 
data pattern is that the lotteries induce households to make non-zero donations; for 
instance, while none of the solicitors in the VCM had a success rate exceeding 40%, 
                                                 
16 An astute reader will realize that we lost money in this fundraising drive given our wage rates and fixed 
costs.  This outcome is in line with “best practice” fundraising results and therefore provides evidence that 
our field experiment was “externally valid.”  For example, Sargeant (2005) shows that most charities lose 
money on their first fundraising endeavors (typically about half of what they invest).  Indeed, in personal 
communications, fundraising experts state that over 90% of first efforts lose money.  This fact highlights 
the significance of building a long-term relationship with donors, as charities typically earn positive returns 
on subsequent campaigns from soliciting households on “warm lists” (Sargeant and Kähler, 1999).   19
more than half of the solicitors in the single-prize lottery had a success rate exceeding 
40%.  Using a Mann-Whitney rank sum test on these data, we find that (i) the percentage 
of households that contributed in the single-prize lottery is significantly greater than the 
percentage of households that contributed in either the VCM or VCM with seed money 
treatments at the p < 0.01 level, and (ii) the percentage of households that contributed in 
the multiple-prize lottery is significantly greater than the percentage of households that 
contributed in the VCM with seed money treatment at the p <0.01 level.
17   
Considering average contributions, as Table 2 summarizes, we find that the 
average donation per contact is greater in our two lottery treatments than in either of the 
VCM treatments:  average contribution levels per household was $1.89 ($1.52) in the 
single-prize (multiple-prize) lottery treatment, considerably larger than average 
contributions under the VCM (VCM with seed money) of $1.01 ($1.16).  Figure 2 
presents the average contribution per household at the solicitor level and highlights the 
effectiveness of the lottery design.  Using the average earnings per household for each 
solicitor as the unit of observation, we find that the $0.88 ($0.73) difference in the single-
prize lottery and the VCM (VCM with seed money) treatment is statistically significant at 
the p < 0.05 level.  For the multiple-prize lottery treatment, the $0.51 difference from the 
VCM treatment is statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level, whereas the difference 
from the VCM with seed money is not statistically significant.
18   
                                                 
17 Figure 1 highlights that the observed treatment effect is not merely driven by a few solicitors.  Indeed, 
assuming independence across solicitors, the probability that the top 7 solicitors were randomly placed in 
the SPL (MPL) rather than being placed in the VCM is 0.6% (3.4%).   
18 Considering conditional contributions, we find that while the VCM and both lottery treatments yield an 
average conditional contribution of $4, $4.17, and $4.25, the VCM with seed money treatment yielded a 
much larger average gift of $7.85 (see Table 2).  Using a Mann-Whitney rank sum test of treatment 
differences at the solicitor level, we find that the differences in conditional contributions in the VCM with 
seed money treatment are significantly greater than those for the VCM and both lottery treatments at the p   20
  To complement these unconditional insights, we estimate a series of linear 
regression models that explicitly control for observable and unobservable differences 
across solicitors.  Specifically, we estimate a linear regression model of the amount 
contributed for each household that answered the door (including zero contributions) on 
dummy variables for our experimental treatments and other covariates: 
ij ij ij Z v L ε + = ) (       ( 6 )  
where Lij is the contribution level of the j
th household to the i
th solicitor, and v(Zij) is a 
linear function of the vector Zij which includes treatment effects and weekend-specific 
effects to control for temporal heterogeneity in giving rates.  To account for unobservable 
heterogeneities at the solicitor level, we cluster the standard errors by solicitor. 
Empirical estimates are presented in Column 1 of Table 3, and provide insights 
consistent with the unconditional results:  households contributed $1.00 ($0.79) more in 
the single (multiple) prize lottery treatment than in the baseline VCM treatment with both 
of these differences statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.   
To gain insights into the factors that influence the decision of households to 
contribute to the Hazards Center, we estimate a probit model of the contribution decision 
of households that answered the door: 
[ ] 1 , 0 ~        N e e X C ij ij ij ij + = β   ,    (7) 
where Cij equals unity if solicitor i received a contribution for household j, and equals 
zero otherwise; Xij includes the treatment effects and weekend-specific effects to control 
for temporal heterogeneity.  We again cluster the standard errors by solicitor. 
                                                                                                                                                 
< 0.05 level.  All remaining differences in conditional contributions across treatment are insignificant at 
conventional levels.   21
  Empirical estimates are presented in Column 3 of Table 3, and indicate that 
households were more likely to contribute if they were approached by a solicitor who was 
randomly placed into one of the lottery treatments:  households are 21.2% (16.8%) more 
likely to contribute in the single-prize (multiple-prize) lottery compared to the VCM 
treatment.  And, households were roughly 31.5% (27.1%) more likely to contribute in the 
single-prize (multiple-prize) lottery compared to the VCM with seed treatment.  All of 
these differences are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.   
As a robustness check, we apply the two-step selection model of Butler and 
Moffitt’s (1982)  
Step 1:    Cij = β`Xij + eij,       ( 8 )  
Step 2:    Lij = v(Zij)+ εij,         ( 9 )  
where variables are defined above.  We specify eij = uij + αi, where the two components 
are independent and normally distributed with mean zero.  It follows that the variance of 
the disturbance term eij is Var(eij) = σu
2 + σα
2.  By construction, the individual random 
effects  αi will capture important heterogeneity across solicitors that would be left 
uncontrolled in a standard cross-sectional model.  And, εij = αi + uij; E[αi] = 0, E[αi
2] = 
σα
2, E[αiαl] = 0 for i ≠ l; and αi and uij are orthogonal for all i and j.
19   
  Empirical estimates from this model are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.  
We include coefficient estimates, standard errors, and estimated marginal effects from the 
two-stage model.  Empirical estimates are similar to those obtained in the simple models 
                                                 
19 Identification is achieved in this model because the inverse Mills ratio is a nonlinear function of the 
regressors.  Accordingly, it is important to highlight certain robustness checks that we employed.  First, we 
estimated the model by including regressors in the first stage probit (a Sunday dummy variable, household 
characteristics, solicitor characteristics, etc.) that we excluded from the second stage.  Every such   22
presented in Table 3:  households were more likely to contribute if they were approached 
by a solicitor in one of the lottery treatments, and conditional on contributing, we find 
that the lotteries yield greater contributions than the VCM.  The power of seed money is 
highlighted in the second-stage regression estimates—the VCM with seed money 
treatment yields considerably larger conditional contributions versus the VCM ($3.54, or 
nearly 100% increase). 
Overall, we interpret the empirical results and data patterns as suggesting three 
major findings: 
Result 1:  Gross proceeds in both lottery treatments are larger than proceeds in 
the VCM and VCM with seed money treatments. 
 
Result 2:  The increased revenue stream in lotteries is largely due to increased 
participation rates, but average contributions are also slightly higher in the 
lotteries.   
 
Result 3:  Conditional on contributing, the VCM with seed money treatment 
induces the largest average gifts.  
 
The first two results on gross contributions are consistent with our theory, but it is clearly 
of interest under which circumstances lotteries would yield a higher provision level of the 
public good.
20  Consider the single-prize lottery treatment.  In this case, 963 households 
were approached and $688 was raised, for an average yield of $0.71 per household 
approached.  In the VCM treatment, the average yield is roughly $0.38.  Thus, if we 
make the assumption that gift rates would have continued in the same pattern if we 
                                                                                                                                                 
specification yielded similar results to those presented below.  Second, further robustness tests are reported 
below. 
20 For certain parameter values, the theory would predict such a superiority of lotteries even for net 
revenues.  As the simplest example, consider symmetric risk-neutral agents which do not experience any 
warm-glow from giving and a perceived credibility  1
LS µµ = = .  Then, VCM with seed provision would 
be given by 1' ( )
S hG =  while the single prize lottery gives: 
1







− =>  which 
immediately implies a larger contribution level under the lottery treatment than under the VCM, i.e. 
SPL S GG > .   23
visited a larger number of homes, a reasonable conjecture given our randomization 
scheme, we would need to approach roughly 3030 households in each treatment for the 
single-prize lottery to net more money than the VCM. 
  For charities interested in long-run success, Result 2 is quite important, as it 
provides evidence of a “double-dividend” associated with lotteries:  not only is the level 
of contributions higher, but the participation rate is enhanced.
21  Fundraisers understand 
that securing a “warm list” of donors is an important requirement for the long-term 
viability of a charity.  In this light, it is important to realize that 40% to 80% more 
households contribute in the lotteries compared to the VCM treatments.  Informal 
investigation of what this additional 40%-80% pool of active contributors actually means 
to a charity leads us to believe that each extra contributor amounts to roughly $65 per 
year in donations.
22  Result 3 highlights that seed money is a powerful incentive 
mechanism in the field.  
People Give to People, Not Causes:  The Role of Individual Characteristics 
  An interesting anecdote among fundraisers is that “people give to people, not 
causes.”  This anecdote perhaps has its roots in a famous statement made by Diogenes 
                                                 
21 Early work on the provisioning of public goods found solutions once every participant decided to 
participate in the mechanisms (see, e.g., Groves and Ledyard, 1977), and therefore focused on increasing 
contributions along the intensive margin.  In this literature, the provision problem is framed within the 
context of a social planner whose objective is to provide a desired aggregate level of a public good.  The 
distinction between increased contributions along the intensive and extensive margins is extraneous from 
the perspective of such a social planner.  In many practical applications, fundraisers are concerned with 
both the aggregate level of contributions received and the total number of contributors.  The participation 
problem and mechanisms that induce gains along the extensive margin are thus important considerations 
for practitioners in the field.  Our result has an analog in the success of certain types of government 
procurement contracts (McAfee and McMillan, 1989), the success of some auction institutions (McAfee 
and McMillan, 1987; Englebrecht-Wiggans, 1993), and the design of income transfer programs (Saez, 
2002). 
22 This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation using estimates provided by several charities.  First, charities 
suggest that the retention rate is roughly 50%-80% (i.e., 50%-80% of those who initially donate will 
contribute during the next round of solicitations).  Second, of those 50%-80% who are retained, they give 
approximately $100 per year.  Our next step in this investigation is to explore this anecdotal evidence.     24
Laertius:  “He [Aristotle] used to say that personal beauty was a better introduction than 
any letter.”
23  In our theory, such effects manifest themselves through the γ  parameter. 
Our data set is sufficiently rich to enable us to examine such an assertion by 
exploring the effects of individual characteristics – i.e., physical attractiveness, obesity, 
self-confidence, etc. – on observed contribution levels.  Some of these characteristics 
have been shown, in quite different environments, to have an important influence on 
economic outcomes (see, e.g., Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 
1998; Mobius and Rosenblatt, 2004).   
Alternatively, there is growing experimental evidence that suggests trusting 
behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000; 
Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004b).  Thus, we might expect to 
find greater contributions received from donors of the same racial group or gender as the 
solicitor who approached their residence.  We visit these conjectures in turn. 
Physical Attractiveness and Giving Behavior                
  The middle panel of Table 2 summarizes solicitor characteristics across the four 
treatments.  These figures can be read as follows:  in the VCM treatment, the average 
standardized personal attractiveness rating was 0.31 with a standard deviation of 0.69.  
There are notable differences in standardized personal attractiveness ratings across our 
experimental treatments, but these differences are not statistically significant at any 
meaningful level using either a two sample t-test for differences in means or a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test.   
                                                 
23 This quote is taken from Hamermesh and Biddle (1994).   25
While our use of “beauty” follows a rich literature, measures of individual body 
mass have also been used in economic analyses (see, e.g., Coller et al., 2002).  As 
discussed previously, we gathered information on solicitor height and weight, which 
allows us to compute a body mass index for each individual, which is a measure of body 
fat based on height and weight that applies to both adult men and women.
24  B M I  
categories are as follows:  underweight, BMI = <18.5; normal weight, BMI = 18.5-24.9; 
overweight, BMI = 25-29.9; and obese, BMI of 30 or greater.    
  We estimated augmented variants of our equations above by expanding Xit and Zit 
to include subject-specific measures.  These empirical estimates are contained in columns 
2 and 4 of Table 3 and columns 3-8 in Table 4.  In terms of the beauty rating, there is 
some evidence that personal attraction matters.  For example, from column 3 in Table 4 
we learn that an increase in the personal attractiveness rating of one unit generates an 
approximate 6.36% increase in the probability that a household will contribute, though 
this effect is only marginally significant.  Furthermore, conditional on contributing, a 
one-unit increase in average personal attractiveness generates an approximate $0.61 
increase in the level of contributions (column 4 in Table 4). 
Exploring this result a level deeper in a series of empirical models that include 
interaction effects to allow a test of gender-specific treatment effects leads to an 
interesting asymmetry.  We find that the empirical results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are 
entirely driven by white females (and primarily driven by households where a male 
answers the door).  It is instructive therefore to consider the effects of personal 
attractiveness for white female solicitors in isolation.  We provide summary empirical 
                                                 
24 BMI is calculated as:  703*(weight in pounds/(height in inches)
2) or, equivalently, as weight in kilograms 
divided by  (height in meters)
2.   26
estimates in Table 5.  The table provides the influence of changes in the personal 
attractiveness ranking of a white female solicitor across the treatments.  The first two 
rows highlight the influence of personal attractiveness on the expected contribution for a 
household that answered the door:  across all treatments a one standard deviation increase 
in female personal attractiveness considerably increases the expected gift.   
Rows 3-6 in Table 5 reveal that this effect is not due to increases in the average 
gift, but rather that it is largely driven by increased participation:  more personally 
attractive female solicitors induce a higher proportion of households to contribute.  This 
result suggests that the effect of personal attractiveness is similar to that of the lottery 
incentive – personal attractiveness elicits contributions from agents who would otherwise 
elect not to contribute.  This insight leads to our next result: 
Result 4:  Physically attractive female solicitors raise more money than their 
peers, and this is largely due to increased participation rates among contributors.   
 
This result can be pushed a bit harder by considering the hourly earnings of solicitors.  
Such estimates provide a rare glimpse at real productivity differences across agents of 
varying personal attractiveness.  The raw data show that a one-standard deviation 
increase in personal beauty increases hourly returns from approximately $6 to more than 
$12, or about 100%. 
Considering the correlation between BMI and solicitor effectiveness, we find only 
a marginal relationship.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 show that only those solicitors 
labeled obese (BMI ≥ 30) raise lower amounts of money than their peers.  Such solicitors 
were roughly 9% less successful in securing contributions (column 5), and received 
conditional contributions that were approximately $6.25 lower than their non-obese   27
peers.  Yet it is important to point out that these estimates are measured imprecisely and 
that only the latter is statistically significant (p < .10, using a two-sided alternative).   
Self-Efficacy and Performance Motivation:  The Influence of Personality 
  Economists have recently begun to provide theoretical models relating individual 
self-confidence (or related personality constructs) and market outcomes (see, e.g., 
Bearden et al, 2001; Benabou and Tirole, 2002).  The lower portion of the middle panel 
in Table 2 presents summary statistics on such measures across our solicitors.  Again, 
there is variation in these measures across our four treatments.   
We examine the role of personality attributes on solicitor earnings by augmenting 
vectors Xit and Zit with these five personality traits.  Empirical estimates are presented in 
columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 and 7 and 8 of Table 4.  Our empirical results suggest that 
solicitor self-efficacy and assertiveness are both marginally significant, with the former 
having a positive influence on the probability of a positive contribution (of roughly 4%) 
and the latter having a 3.2% negative influence.  We again explore this result more 
thoroughly in ancillary regression models, and find that a one-unit increase in self-
motivation and self-efficacy for the median white male solicitor – i.e., a white male 
solicitor with mean physical attributes – in the single-prize lottery treatment generates a 
5.5% increase in the probability that the solicitor elicits a contribution from each 
household visited.  Given that the average contribution level for households that 
contribute in the single-prize lottery treatment is $4.16 – a single unit increase in 
performance motivation and self-efficacy generates an increase in average contributions 
of approximately $0.23 (12.2 percent) per household approached.  Overall, the set of 
empirical estimates leads us to our next result:   28
Result 5:  Personality attributes are correlated with solicitor productivity.  The 
effects of these personality traits are on the probability that the solicitor will elicit 
a contribution. 
 
Equally as important, however, are the findings reported in columns 9 and 10 of Table 4.  
In this “full-blown” empirical model, we find that measured treatment and personal 
attractiveness effects remain strongly significant, lending further support to Results 1-4.  
And, in ancillary regression models, all of the results noted above hold in the “full-
blown” empirical model.  We discuss this in greater detail below. 
Social Connection and Giving Behavior 
  Our theoretical model highlights the importance of credibility.  Given the 
uncertainty regarding the credibility of charitable organizations, actions that signal 
quality might increase individual contribution levels.  If a similar phenomenon occurs at 
the individual level – potential donors trust (and prefer) solicitors of like social groupings 
more than those of different social groupings – then one might expect to see differential 
rates of giving between solicitors and donors of similar race and/or gender.      
  The bottom panel of Table 2 summarizes the racial and gender composition of our 
solicitors and the households visited across our four experimental treatments.  One stark 
feature of the data is the high percentage of potential donors approached who are 
Caucasian relative to the percentage of Caucasian solicitors.  Between 85% to 91% of the 
households were Caucasian.  In contrast, the percentage of Caucasian solicitors employed 
ranges from 50% to 72%.  Across all four treatments, the percentage of both Caucasian 
male and female solicitors is less than the percentage of households of the corresponding 
racial and gender mix at the p < 0.05 level using a two-sample test of proportions.     29
  Table 6 summarizes the average contributions received per household at the 
solicitor level across our different treatments by social grouping.  The figures can be read 
as follows:  the average Caucasian solicitor raised $1.68 when visiting a household of the 
same race, and when the identical solicitor approached a household of a different race the 
solicitor raised on average $0.95.  In the pooled data, the difference in contributions 
between Caucasian and non-Caucasian households to Caucasian solicitors ($0.73 = 
$1.68-$0.95) is larger than the comparable difference among non-Caucasian solicitors 
($0.53 = $1.31-$0.78), suggesting that, upon controlling for solicitor-specific effects by 
exploiting purely within person deviations, there is a tendency for Caucasian households 
to give more to Caucasian solicitors.  The difference is roughly on the order of 40%.  If 
one simply is agnostic about solicitor effects, then a simple comparison between $1.68 
and $1.31 (column 1, rows 1 and 2 of Table 6) yields similar insights.   
Alternatively, if one considers differences along gender lines, the data suggest 
that male solicitors secure on average $0.19 more from male households ($1.39-$1.20), 
whereas women secured on average $0.58 ($1.86-$1.28) more from male households, 
suggesting that even after solicitor effects are controlled, there is a tendency for male 
households to give more to women solicitors than to male solicitors.  Upon more 
carefully examining these data in a fully-interactive regression model similar to equations 
(8) and (9), we find that the $0.58 difference is largely due to more physically attractive 
women having greater success among male households, leading to our final result:   
Result 6:  There is some evidence of social connection among racial groups, but 
not among genders. 
 
The first portion of Result 6 is consistent with the recent laboratory evidence that 
suggests trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection (see, e.g.,   30
Glaeser et al., 2000; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001).  The latter part of Result 6 provides a 
bound to this insight:  examining gifts from male households, physically attractive female 
solicitors elicit higher contributions than male solicitors (of equal personal 
attractiveness), causing the social connection argument to break down between genders.
25   
Alternative Theoretical Interpretation 
  The goal of our theoretical framework is to provide a parsimonious model, 
allowing risk aversion and heterogeneous tastes, to compare the critical link between 
lotteries and public good provisioning.  The model highlights that lotteries can 
outperform VCMs even when traditional explanations, such as risk loving behavior or 
consumption of gambling, are suppressed.  Given that our field experiment provides a 
glimpse of behavior in the natural environment that our theory intends to explain, alone it 
cannot discriminate between such alternative explanations.  What is necessary to explore 
the underlying structure at work is complementary evidence.   
If the motive for giving in our lotteries is pure love of gambling or risk-loving 
behavior, then variation in the social value of the public good should have no effect on 
betting behavior.  Further, under either of these alternative motives, variation in the 
structure of the prize payment scheme should have no effect on giving rates.  We present 
                                                 
25 As a robustness check, it is important to discuss how our estimated treatment effects varied as we added 
numerous solicitor and household controls to the various specifications.  A few general remarks hold.  First, 
Results 1-6 are each robust to inclusion of the full complement of solicitor controls (age, race, gender, work 
experience, beauty, BMI, and personality scores) and household controls (age, gender, race, census block 
income level) in all models.  For example, across all specifications, we find that households are more likely 
to contribute to the Hazards Center when contributions are linked to a chance of winning a lottery prize.  
Thus, the “double-dividend” result that we highlighted earlier is robust to quite demanding environments.  
Additionally, the effect of personal attractiveness remains robust, with estimates indicating that a one 
standard deviation increase in female solicitor physical attractiveness is roughly equivalent  to the 
difference in gifts between the lotteries and VCMs.  We provide one set of empirical estimates in Appendix 
D. 
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new experimental evidence, evidence from naturally-occurring data, and anecdotal 
evidence that is at odds with these alternative motives and in support of our theory.   
For our experimental evidence, ideally we would have preferred to conduct a 
“pure” lottery field treatment to examine the relationship between the social value of the 
public good and betting behavior, but North Carolina statute § 14-309.15 states that it is 
illegal to run a raffle in North Carolina for which the proceeds do not go to a non-profit.  
We are, however, able to provide evidence from laboratory experiments to test this 
critical link.   
In Appendix E, we describe our experimental design and present our data.  In our 
setting, if agents de-link lottery contributions from the provision of the public good, then 
altering the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to such contributions should not impact 
contributions.  Figure E summarizes average contribution levels for agents within each of 
the three different MPCR levels across both the single- and multiple-prize lottery 
treatments.  As illustrated in the figure, average contribution levels are increasing in the 
per capita return to the public account.  In the single-prize lottery, average contribution 
levels for agents with an MPCR of 0.10 is approximately 45 percent of the original 
endowment (100 tokens).  As the MPCR increases to 0.90, the average contribution level 
increases to approximately 75 percent of the original endowment.  A similar pattern of 
behavior emerges for the multiple-prize lottery.  Such a pattern of behavior is inconsistent 
with a “love of gambling” theory and provides support for our theoretical model.   
We have also gathered naturally-occurring data in an effort to understand the 
causes of the data patterns observed in our field experiment.  Our approach is to compare 
annual per capita lottery expenditures across states that earmark lottery proceeds for   32
primary education versus those that allocate lottery proceeds to the state’s “general 
fund”.
26  If agents de-link lottery contributions from the provision of the public good, 
then we would not expect there to be any differences in per capita lottery expenditures.   
Using state-level panel data from 1990-2000, we estimated several empirical 
models that regressed the natural logarithm of annual per capita lottery expenditures on a 
vector of regressors, including a dichotomous variable for the earmarking of lottery 
proceeds.  We included state and year fixed/random effects in some models and clustered 
the standard errors by state in other models.  Empirical estimates from these models 
provide insights suggestive of the importance of linking lottery purchases with the 
provision of a public good:  per capita lottery expenditures are greater when proceeds are 
earmarked for primary education versus the state’s general fund, with this difference 
being statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level across these various specifications.     
Further empirical support of our theory can be obtained by recognizing that the 
jackpot “rollover” characteristic of many naturally-occurring lotteries presents a useful 
natural experiment about lottery motives.  For example, Cook and Clotfelter (1993) show 
that the betting response to the rollover amount is disproportionate compared to the pari-
mutuel part.  This is consistent with our theory but inconsistent with the proposed 
alternatives.
27 
                                                 
26 From 1990-2000, we observe per capita lottery expenditures in twelve states that exclusively allocated 
proceeds to the state’s general fund, nine states that earmarked funds exclusively for primary education, 
and six states that switched the allocation of lottery proceeds between the state’s general fund and primary 
education.  Of the six states that switched how lottery proceeds were allocated, Montana went from 
designating funds for primary education to the state’s general fund.  The remaining five states changed the 
designation of lottery proceeds from the state’s general fund to primary education.  All data on lottery 
revenue come from the United States Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances, series GF, No. 3 
annual.  Population data are taken from the 2004-2005 Statistical Abstract of the United States.  
27 See also the laboratory evidence in Dale (2004).     33
Finally, there is considerable anecdotal evidence in support of the linkage as well, 
as noted by comments from a Pennsylvania official who stated (Douglas, 1995, p. 365):  
“One of the secrets of the Pennsylvania lottery is having targeted the proceeds. And 
having the public know where the money goes really seems to help ticket sales.”
28   
V. Concluding Remarks 
This study moves toward an understanding of the economics of charity by 
exploring the demand side of charitable fundraising.  We approached nearly 5000 
households in an actual door-to-door fundraiser designed to test our theory while 
simultaneously raising capital for the Natural Hazards Mitigation Research Center.   
Following our theoretical model, we randomly divided solicitors into four distinct 
treatments, two that made use of variants of the popular voluntary contribution 
mechanism and two that used lotteries.   
  Empirical results provide confirmation of our theoretical predictions – lottery 
treatments raised roughly 50% more in gross proceeds than our VCM treatments.  This 
result is driven largely by greater participation rates in the lotteries, as lotteries increase 
participation rates by roughly 100%.  As such, this finding highlights an attractive feature 
of lotteries that is rarely discussed:  they provide fundraisers with a tool to generate 
“warm lists.”  Interestingly, this result has several analogs in the economics literature.  
For example, inducing participation among agents who would otherwise not participate is 
at the crux of the seminal work on the success of certain types of government 
                                                 
28 As an aside, consider another piece of anecdotal evidence.  Suppose that risk-loving motives were 
paramount.  In this case, if one assumed the analog of decreasing absolute risk aversion, then richer 
individuals would be the most risk-loving and hence the most likely to play lotteries.  We tested this 
conjecture by regressing lottery bets on income.  Rather than finding a positive coefficient, we found a 
negative estimate.  Thanks to John Morgan for pointing us in this direction and providing the citation. 
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procurement contracts (McAfee and McMillan, 1989).  Whereas these authors are 
concerned with minimizing costs—they find that granting price preferences to certain 
bidders can reduce expected contracting costs—the underlying mechanism works in 
much the same manner that lotteries operate to induce higher revenues.  Other parallels to 
this finding can be found in the mechanism design literature for publicly provided public 
goods, auction design, and the like.   
We also find that a one-standard deviation in physical attractiveness among 
women solicitors is roughly equivalent to the increase in contributions when we move 
from the VCM to the lottery treatments (or ≈ 50%-100%).  This result is largely driven 
by increased participation rates among male households.  Such a finding is interesting in 
light of the fact that there is little evidence on the relative efficacy of institutional and 
non-institutional factors.  In this sense, it is surprising to find that a change from the most 
inferior treatment (VCM) to perhaps one of the most attractive (lotteries), in a theoretical 
sense, yields a treatment effect that is similar to a one-standard deviation change in 
personal attractiveness.     35
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Note:  Each cell represents one unique session in which we gathered data using one of the four treatments – 
VCM, VCM with Seed Money, Single-Prize Lottery, and Multiple-Prize Lottery.  For example, row 1, 
column 1, denotes that session one of the VCM treatment employed three solicitors that approached a total 
of 608 houses, of which 208 answered the door.  Each solicitor participated in a single session and each 
household was approached by a single solicitor. 
  
                                                 
29 In this treatment, the solicitors worked only 5 hours on Saturday before quitting.   39
Table 2: Summary Statistics  
   
VCM 
 










1186 1282  963  1402 
Total Households Home  446  453  363  493 
# of Households that 
Contributed 
113 67  165  177 
Percent of Households 
Contributing 
25.3%  14.8% 45.5% 35.9% 











Average Donation per 










Solicitor Characteristics       
Total # of Solicitors  7  12  10  15 
Average Earnings per Hour  $5.71  $4.35  $7.13  $5.81 
















% of Male Caucasian 
Solicitors 
28.6% 16.7%  40%  33.3% 
% of Female Caucasian 
Solicitors 
42.8% 33.3%  30%  26.7% 
% of Male Non-Caucasian 
Solicitors 
14.3% 33.3%  10%  13.3% 
% Female Non-Caucasian 
Solicitors 
14.3% 16.7%  20%  26.7% 










































       
Household Characteristics       
Percent of Households – 
Male Caucasian 
43.7%  46.2% 47.1% 40.4% 
Percent of Households – 
Female Caucasian 
46.9%  41.6% 38.0% 46.5% 
Percent of Households – 
Male Non-Caucasian 
4.0%  5.5% 6.1% 6.7% 
Percent of Households – 
Female Non-Caucasian 
3.4%  4.6% 8.0% 6.3% 








Note:  Figures in the table represent summary statistics across the different treatments.   40
Table 3: Household Contribution Decisions 





Pr (Cij > 0) 
Model B 
Pr (Cij > 0) 














































































      
Weekend Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered on 
Solicitor 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations  1754 1754 1754 1754 
** Denotes significance at the p < 0.05 level; * Denotes significance at the p < 0.10 level 
Note:  Cell entries in columns 1 and 2 provide parameter estimates for a linear regression model of 
contribution levels (including the zeroes) for our experiment.  Cell entries in columns 3 and 4 provide 
parameter estimates for a model estimating the probability that a household made a contribution to the 
Hazards Center.  Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered around individual solicitor 
effects.  Cell entries can be read as follows – average contribution levels in the SPL treatment (column 1, 
row 3) are approximately $1.00 greater than those for our baseline VCM treatment.   Furthermore, agents in 
this treatment (column 3, row 3) are more likely to contribute to the Hazards Center than in the VCM.    
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Table 4: Regression Estimates  




























































































































































BMI < 18.5 



























BMI ≥ 30 















































(0.39)   42
[1.6%] [-$0.04]  [$0.03] 
Solicitor 
Sociability 




































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of 
Observations 
1754 522 1754 522 1754 522 1754 522 1754 522 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.01 level; * Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level; ^ Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.10 
level 
Note: Cell entries in Columns 1, 3, and 5 are the parameter estimates for the first-stage selection model.  The selection process is estimated using a random-
effects probit model.  Cell entries in Columns 2, 4, and 6 are the parameter estimates from the second stage random effects model of contribution levels 
conditioned on non-zero donations.  Standard errors are in parentheses and marginal probabilities (marginal effects) are in brackets.  Marginal probabilities for 
beauty, the body mass index indicators, and personality traits were calculated as the difference of Prob[Z≤0 + βi] and Prob[Z≤0] and are thus upper bounds on the 
underlying marginal probabilities.  The marginal probability for the i
th treatment effect was calculated as the difference between Prob[Z≤βVCM + βi] and 
Prob[Z≤βVCM].  Marginal effects for the treatments are calculated at the mean values of the Mills ratio and weekend dummies and are the difference between 
contributions in the VCM and the given treatment.   43
Table 5:  Predicted Contributions and Personal attractiveness – Majority Female Solicitor 




() 0 it EC B e a u t y =   $0.99 $2.17 
() 1 it E C Beauty =   $2.19 $3.23 
() Pr 0 0 it C Beauty >=   17.6% 43.7% 
() Pr 0 1 it C Beauty >=   37.5% 60.7% 
() 0, 0 it it E C C Beauty >=   $5.65 $4.97 
() 0, 1 it it E C C Beauty >=   $5.84 $5.33 
Note:  Cell entries are estimated probabilities and conditional contributions (from Columns 3 and 4 in 
Table 8) for a majority female solicitor with indicated personal attractiveness ranking.  Both the estimated 
probabilities and conditional contribution levels are evaluated at the treatment mean values (see Table 2) 
for all model covariates except personal attractiveness.  Cell entries can be read as follows: in the VCM 
treatments, a majority female solicitor with mean beauty ranking (beauty ranking = 1) is predicted to elicit 
contributions from 17.6% (37.5%) of the households visited.  The conditional contribution for such a 
solicitor is $5.65 ($5.84), which generates an expected contribution per household of $0.99 ($2.19).  
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Table 6: Average Contributions per House by Social Connection – Solicitor Level 
  All Data  VCM  Seed  SPL  MPL 
Caucasian Solicitor       


















Non-Caucasian Solicitor       




















Male Solicitor       




















Female Solicitor       




















** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level using a matched pairs t-test 
* Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level using a matched pairs t-test 
 
Note:  Cell  entries are the solicitor average for mean donations per household visited across social 
connection.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  For example, a Caucasian solicitor approaching a 
household of the same race in the VCM treatment would expect to raise $1.68 on average.  The same 
solicitor approaching a household of a different race would expect to raise $0.95 on average. 
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Appendix A – Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
From the first-order conditions (2) and (3) we obtain that 
S b  and 
nS b  are smaller than the 
contribution level 
VCM b  given by  '( ) '( ) '( )
VCM S VCM VCM uwb hn b fb µγ −= + . For the 
symmetric equilibrium under lottery  { , } LS P L M P L ∈ , condition (5) reads as 
'( ) '( ) '( )
1





uwb hn b fb










L H  was defined in footnote 9. The inequality in condition (A1) immediately 
implies the claim for 
SL µ µ ≤ . The ambiguity for the case 
SL µ µ >  can easily be seen by 
choosing 0
SL µµ >=  and  0 γ = . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
In order to compare contributions to the two lotteries, we have only to compare the 
respective right-hand sides (RHS) of (A1): If 
MPL RHS  is larger (smaller) than 
SPL RHS  
when evaluated at 
SPL b , 
SPL b  is larger (smaller) than 
MPL b . Consider first the case of 
small risk-aversion in the extreme of risk neutrality. Here,  
1
'( )
LL L RHS u w b H P
nb
⎡ ⎤ →− − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
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which, using  '( )/ '( ) 0 uwb z uwb −+ − → (for  0 z > ,  ''( )/ '( ) uu − →∞    ) implies 
/1
SPL MPL RHS RHS < , i.e.0
SPL MPL RHS RHS >>, and therefore 
SPL MPL bb <  for 
sufficiently large levels of risk aversion. 
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Ranking of Single vs. Multi-prize lotteries – Heterogeneity 
 
To see the ambiguity in comparing the revenues of the two lotteries consider the case 
where 0 γ = . For symmetric agents, Proposition 2 implies that MPL yields less than SPL.  
However, examples can easily be constructed where contributions increase by splitting 
the prize: assuming 2 agents with  ' ( ) 1 /50 high hB B = −  and another  2 n−  agents with 
'( )1 / 2 5 low hB B =− , we obtain (i) zero contributions under the VCM, (ii) a socially 
optimal provision level of 
* 25 G = , (iii) in lottery SPL zero contributions of the low 
valuation player, total contributions of 
1/2 5
SPL B P =  by the two high-value players (from 
condition (A2)), (iv) participation of the remaining  2 n−  players in lottery MPL (from 
condition (3)), and (v) a higher total contribution level in MPL than in SPL if and only if 
10 n ≥  (using numerical methods). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
We assume that all agents are risk neutral, i.e. without loss of generality  '( ) 1 u =    and that 
SL µ µµ ==.  In order to compare lotteries with a VCM, let k  denote the number of 
agents with highest marginal valuation  11 '( ) ... '( ) '( ) kk hG hG h G + = => , i.e. the number of 
participants in the VCM with seed treatment which gives  '( ) '( / ) 1
SS
i hB P fB k µγ + +=  
( 1,..., ik = ).  Consider incentives of player  1 k +  to contribute in the single prize lottery 
SPL (condition (5).  She will contribute if and only if  
,,
1 1' ( ) ' ( 0 ) / 0
k SPL k SPL
k hB f P B µγ + −+ + + >       ( A 2 )  
where 
, kS P L B  is given by the total contribution level in SPL if only the k highest value 
players contribute:  
,, , (1 '( ) '( / )) ( 1) /
kS P L kS P L kS P L
k hB fB k B P k k µγ −− = − .      (A3) 
As 
, /0
kS P L PB >  is increasing in P, gets the participation of additional players the more 
likely the larger the prize level is.  An analogous argument holds for the 2 prize lottery 
MPL. Here, player  1 k +  will contribute if and only if  
,, ,
1 1' ( ) ' ( 0 ) / / ( 2 ( 1 ) ) 0
k MPL k MPL k MPL
k hB f P B P B k µγ + −+ + + + − >      (A4) 
where 
, kM P L B  would result as contributions in the 2-prize lottery if only the k highest 
value players participated: 
,, , (1 '( ) '( / )) ( 1) / /(2( 1))
k MPL k MPL k MPL
k hB fB k B P k kP k µγ −− = − − − .     (A5) 
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. 
It is easily shown that 
SM TT < . In general, it therefore depends on the curvature of 
'() k h   ,  1 '( ) k h +   , and  '( ) f γ   , and the comparison of 
, kM P L B  and 
, kS P L B  whether or not it is 
more likely that agent  1 k +  participates in MPL than in SPL.     48
Appendix B – Solicitation Scripts 
ECU Center for Natural Hazards Mitigation Research - Script 
 
(If a minor answers the door, please ask to speak to a parent. Never enter a house.) 
 
Hi, my name is _____________________. I am an ECU student visiting Pitt County households 
today on behalf of the newly formed ECU Natural Hazards Mitigation Research Center.  
 
(Hand the blue brochure to the resident). 
 
You may recall hurricanes Dennis and Floyd five years ago led to widespread devastation in 
Eastern North Carolina, hence the State authorized the new Hazards Center.  
 
This research center will provide support and coordination for research on natural hazard 
risks, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding.  
 
The primary goal of the center is to reduce the loss of life and property damages due to 
severe weather events.  
 
We are collecting contributions today on behalf of the new ECU Hazards Center. The Center 




To raise funds for the new ECU Hazard Center we are conducting a charitable raffle: 
•  The winner receives a $1,000 prepaid MasterCard. 
•  For every dollar you contribute, you will receive 1 raffle ticket. 
•  The odds of winning this charitable raffle are based on your contribution and  total 
contributions received from other Pitt County households. 
•  The charitable raffle winner will be drawn at the Center on December 17
th at noon. 
The winner will be notified and the results posted on the Center’s web site. 
•  All proceeds raised by the raffle will fund the Hazards Center, which is a non-profit 
organization. 
 
Would you like to make a contribution today? 
 
(If you receive a contribution, please write a receipt that includes their name and contribution 
amount).  
 
(solicitors in the VCM (lottery) treatments were told that if the resident asks, contributions are 
(not) tax deductible).   
 
If you have questions regarding the Center or want additional information, there is a phone 
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Appendix C – Personality Questionnaire 
 
Assertiveness 
1.  I take control of things (Positive Frame) 
2.  I express myself easily (Positive Frame) 
3.  I am not highly motivated to succeed (Negative Frame) 
4.  I cannot come up with new ideas (Negative Frame) 
 
Sociability 
1.  I talk to a lot of different people at parties (Positive Frame) 
2.  I am skilled in handling social situations (Positive Frame) 
3.  I have difficulty expressing my feelings (Negative Frame) 
4.  I often feel uncomfortable around other people (Negative Frame) 
 
Self-Efficacy 
1.  I formulate ideas clearly (Positive Frame) 
2.  I am able to think quickly (Positive Frame) 
3.  I undertake few things on my own (Negative Frame) 
4.  I never challenge things (Negative Frame) 
 
Performance Motivation 
1.  I set high standards for myself and others (Positive Frame) 
2.  I do more than what is expected of me (Positive Frame) 
3.  I do just enough work to get by (Negative Frame) 
4.  I think that in some situations it is important that I not succeed (Negative Frame) 
 
Self-Confidence 
1.  I just know that I will be a success (Positive Frame) 
2.  I have a lot of personal ability (Positive Frame)  
3.  I often think that there is nothing I can do well (Negative Frame) 
4.  I question my ability to do my work properly (Negative Frame) 
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Appendix D:  Regression Results with Controls for Household Characteristics 
 
  Model A  Model B 
 1
st Stage  2
nd Stage  1




















































































































































































Weekend Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 




Number of Observations  1734  517  1754  522 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level; * Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.10 
level. 
Note: Cell entries provide parameter estimates for a two-stage sample selection model that includes 
controls for household characteristics.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix E:  Laboratory Experiments to Test Alternative Theories 
 
  To examine the impact of MPCR on contribution level in the single fixed-prize 
lottery (SPL) and a multiple-prize lottery (MPL) counterpart of the fixed-prize lottery, we 
ran a series of laboratory experiments that followed the basic design of Morgan and 
Sefton (2000).  The data reported come from four different treatments (a single treatment 
each for the symmetric multiple-prize and single-prize lotteries and a single treatment 
each for the asymmetric counterparts of these lotteries).  All treatments were conducted at 
the University of Maryland-College Park and are comprised of multiple sessions held on 
separate days with different subjects.   
  At the beginning of the session, each subject was seated at linked computer 
terminals that were used to transmit all decision and payoff information.  The sessions 
each consisted of 12 rounds, the first two being practice.  The subjects were instructed 
that the practice rounds would not affect earnings.  Once the individuals were seated and 
logged into the terminals, a set of instructions and a record sheet were handed out.  The 
subjects were asked to follow along as the instructions were read aloud.  After the 
instructions were read and the subjects’ questions were answered the first practice round 
began.  
  At the beginning of each round subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 
four.  The subjects were not aware of whom they were grouped with, but they did know 
that the groups changed every round.   Each round the subjects were endowed with 100 
tokens.  Their task was simple: decide how many tokens to place in the group account 
and how many to keep in their private account.  The decision was entered in the computer 
and also recorded on the record sheet.  When all subjects had made their choice, the 
computer would inform them of the total number of tokens placed in their group account, 
the number of points from the group account and the private account, as well as the 
number of bonus points earned.  The payoff for the round was determined by summing 
the points from the group account, points from the private account, and any bonus points 
received.  Once each of the subjects had recorded this information, the next round would 
begin. 
  The points for each round were determined as follows.  For all sessions, subjects 
received 1 point for each token placed in their private account.  In the sessions with 
symmetric valuations for the public good, they were awarded either 0.3 points for each 
token placed in the group account by themselves and other members of their group.  In 
the sessions with asymmetric valuations for the public good, subjects were awarded 
wither 0.9 or 0.1 points for each token placed in the group account by themselves and the 
other members of their group.
30  Additionally each session had a different method for 
earning bonus points.   
  In the single fixed-prize lottery sessions, group members competed for a lottery 
prize of 80 points.  Each subject’s chance of the winning the prize was based on his or 
her contribution to the group account relative to the aggregate number of tokens placed in 
the group account by all group members.  For the n-prize lottery sessions, group members 
                                                 
30 In the asymmetric sessions, there was one agent in each group of four that had a valuation for the public 
account of 0.9 and three agents who had valuations of 0.1 for tokens placed in the group account.   
Individual valuations were held constant through the sessions and each group of four had exactly one 
member with the high valuation and three members with the low valuation.   52
competed for three lottery prizes of values 50, 20, and 10 points, respectively, where each 
agent could not win more than one prize.  As in the single fixed-prize lottery sessions, a 
subject’s chance of winning first prize was based on his or her share of group 
contributions.  The three prizes were awarded in order of value and without replacement. 
  At the end of the session, one of the non-practice rounds was chosen at random as 
the round that would determine earnings.  Subjects were paid $1.00 for every 15 points 
earned.  In a second experiment, we obtained measures of individual risk aversion 
coefficients for every participant.   
Figure E summarizes average contribution levels for agents with each of the four 
different MPCR levels across both the single- and multiple-prize lottery treatments.
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Note: This figure reports the percentage of tokens contributed to the public account across a series of 
laboratory experiments.  For each session, the total value of the prize provided to the lottery winners was 
held constant at 80 bonus points (approximately $5.33).  The data provide information on 144 unique 
subjects – 36 subjects in each treatment with an MPCR = 0.30, 27 subjects in each treatment with an 
MPCR = 0.10, and 9 subjects in each treatment with an MPCR = 0.90.    
                     
 
                                                 
31 In terms of testing the alternative hypotheses, these results are in line with Morgan and Sefton (2000). 